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Communications continues to be a major issue in post-disaster after-action 
reports. Under the umbrella term interoperability grant funding is facilitating 
deployment of equipment to enable field personnel to patch radio systems 
together, with the expectation of improving emergency scene communications. 
However, numerous causal factors, beyond hardware limitations, contribute to 
inadequate disaster communications. Communications impediments include 
insufficient radio infrastructure, behavioral reactions by people in stressful 
situations, intergovernmental relations, inadequate procedures and training, and 
general lethargy over the need to institute special operating policies, distinct from 
routine practices. Relying solely on technological solutions, without providing 
training and practice, greatly reduces the effectiveness of radio patching 
equipment. Contrary to the intended effect, patching equipment, in the hands of 
those minimally familiar with the radio system architecture, is likely to produce 
radio communications system overload and sector vulnerability. This paper 
examines the domain of emergency scene communications, including 
recommendations that reach beyond technological solutions.  
   
INTRODUCTION    
 
The public servants in our communities — America’s firefighters, law enforcement officers, 
emergency medical personnel, and a host of allied professionals, provide the first-line of defense 
and protection to our communities in times of crisis. Hundreds of millions of dollars in homeland 
security funds have been spent to provide interoperable radio communications, yet the human 
behavioral aspect of radio communications has not been adequately addressed. Nationwide, 
numerous reports (Department of Homeland Security, 2004; National Task Force on 
Interoperability, 2003; Lund, 2002) have identified a problem with radio communications at the 
scene of disasters, yet the assumption has incorrectly been that the problem is largely a technical 
one: Once disparate radios are connected, effective operational communications will result 
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(Newsday, 2005.). The assumption is that communications will improve if more users are added 
together on the same channels.  
This is a flawed assumption for two reasons. Superfluous radio transmissions contribute to 
the auditory overload of first responders at the emergency scene, obscuring development of an 
accurate operational picture for all involved, and radio spectrum is a limited commodity — once 
it’s full, it’s full.  Even if 700 MHz channels are opened for full use later this decade, there will 
always be a practical limit to the number of people who can operate on a common platform 
before the quality of effective communications deteriorates.1 
Policies and practices need to be reexamined from a human behavioral perspective, to 
develop new strategies which will facilitate effective communications.  A central question is 
whether the more significant interoperability issue is behavioral, and if so, which behavioral 
adaptations will enhance the crisis communications capabilities of the first responder 
community?  This is an issue we cannot simple buy our way out of by merely deploying more 
equipment. 
Interoperability has been misapplied as a catch-all phrase to describe a multitude of issues 
surrounding emergency scene communications.  Does it refer to police officers being able to talk 
to firefighters at the same incident; local fire officials talking to neighboring fire agencies? Are 
we talking about federal agencies with radio connection to state and local officials? Is it 
implemented at the scene, or command post, or Emergency Operations Center? Will radio 
interoperability be provided for every responder, or command-to-command, only? Or does it 
address the wider issue of radio system coverage, frequency spectrum capacities, technology 
piece ergonomics, and alternate (non-voice) communications methods? 
There is a larger, unacknowledged and unaddressed human factors issue regarding the need 
for new procedures involved in the communications process. The first responder and homeland 
security communities have misjudged the radio interoperability issue as being solely 
technological. This misaligned approach has resulted in the expenditure of hundreds of millions 
of dollars on communications patching equipment predicated on the assumption that emergency 
scene communication will instantly and automatically be improved once the equipment is bought 
and plugged in (Davidson, 2005). The complexities of the communications process require 
greater examination and modification before any turnkey solution will produce a meaningful 
result. 
The mandate to the first responder community, post 9/11, has been to fix interoperability. 
Since that time, an estimated $1.5 billion has been spent on radio hardware to facilitate 
interoperability. Despite the focus on the word interoperability, there is still no agreed upon 
definition of interoperability. Does interoperability refer to configuring a radio to enable it to talk 
to any other radio that may be present at the scene of an emergency response?  At the same 
                                                 
1 While the Federal Communications Commission has reserved a block of channels for public safety use, many 
metropolitan areas are precluded from using these channels until a relatively few television stations migrate to 




traffic accident, state police, local police, ambulance and fire personnel may be present.  Are we 
advocating all of them hearing each other, interactively sending voice radio messages to one 
another? One definition, pre-dating 9/11, came from a cross-section of industry professionals 
assigned to the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee.  They define interoperability as “an 
essential communication link within public safety and public service wireless communication 
systems which permits units from two or more different agencies to interact with one another and 
to exchange information according to a prescribed method in order to achieve predictable 
results” (Irving, 1996, p. 49). 
To some, interoperability is intended for command-to-command use only.  This perspective 
is much more feasible than trying to commingle all of the responders on a single channel. 
Experienced first responders readily acknowledge their own segmented channels frequently 
become contentious during such incidents; with so many units talking they cover one another, 
hampering effective communications.  What will the exponential loading of the channel be like if 
four busy channels, loaded with agency-specific conversations are mixed on the same radio 
platform?  Will the resultant tower of babble be helpful to everyone at the scene?  Will first 
responders readily adopt the less is more posture needed when combining so many critical 
communications onto one channel, instead of partitioning them into appropriately defused 
platforms, so agency-specific communications can continue?  It would be far more desirable to 
keep agencies on their routine operating platforms, clearing non-incident chatter on other 
incidents to separate channels.  
A compelling case can be made for establishing an incident-specific common command 
channel among all agencies responding to the critical incident, but it must not be used as a poor 
substitute for a sound incident command system.  Senior command personnel, as dictated by 
policy, will congregate at a single incident command post, to collaborate, coordinate, and 
communicate with their own personnel.  The National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
included this recommendation and is supposed to be universally understood and applied, 
nationwide, as a condition for continued grant funding. 
While a lot of agencies say they have it, when it comes to NIMS, evidence of its application 
in the field is weak, especially regarding multi-agency presence from a single incident command 
post. Reasons for slow or no adoption of NIMS policy range from traditional resistance to 
change, to a state of general denial of the possibility that a large-scale emergency can happen in 
any given jurisdiction, to what may be the biggest factor of all—a reluctance to answer the 
“who’s in charge?” question within areas of historic turf battles, especially relating to police vs. 
fire department rivalries, and/or squabbles between various levels of government.   
Traditionally, there has been a tendency in organizations to devise hardware solutions for a 
whole range of challenges, instead of addressing human engineering issues. It is understandable 
that a turnkey solution is hoped for—the purchase and delivery of new equipment signals 
tangible evidence that something is being done.  The proof of concept comes only months, and 
sometimes years, later.  Considering that the kind of incidents we are preparing for are the 
statistically unlikely exceptions, occurring only, perhaps, once or twice in a generation, it is 
difficult for new equipment to get a proper test, even in the most realistic training exercise 
environment.  
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The response to Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005 is an early indicator, a weak signal 
perhaps, of the failure to really address the need regarding critical incident communications. 
These failures run counter to the expected result, especially after so much money has been 
expended with the expectations of instant communications improvement. “Police and other 
emergency agencies responding to Hurricane Katrina were plagued by the same communications 
problems exposed by the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, yet a solution is still considered 
years away” (Kerr, 2005).  
Radio interoperability is one of many areas where homeland security is evolving so fast that 
it is outrunning the research. The frenzy to answer allegations of inefficient on-scene radio 
communications reported in the 9/11 Commission Report has led to the purchase of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of hardware, yet much of the problem is behavioral and is likely to be 
exacerbated by patching radio users together, instead of achieving the intended outcome, which 
is to actually facilitate communication. New patching equipment is being deployed nationwide, 
with little, or no, guidance nor consensus on proper use. Due to the nature of radio system 
architecture, patching equipment actually makes previously “guarded” or well-managed systems 
vulnerable, because for the first time, their airtime can be impacted by users outside of their 
system. 
Standards on Emergency Scene Operations   
Of particular interest is the deployment in recent months of NIMS and the formation of a center 
to create and issue standards on emergency scene operations, including communications (NIMS, 
2004). Another document receiving attention is the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (Standard 
1600), released in 2004. It is currently undergoing debate at the committee level, and will likely 
undergo significant update and modification within its three-year review cycle. The 9/11 
Commission Report focused considerable attention on dysfunctions present in the first responder 
community (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). It should continue to be a catalyst 
for change for many years to come. It is already attracting a lot of attention to the subject, as 
evidenced by the designation of interoperability as being the top priority for grant proposal 
evaluations.  
We are also starting to see the inclusion of funding for training accompanying inter-
operability grant programs, signaling some recognition of the importance of attention to non-
hardware solutions, yet specific examples of actual training applications are difficult to find. 
What constitutes interoperability training is vague and nonspecific, leaving room for the 
requesting jurisdiction to include the component in their grant application without actually 
devoting attention to what the training will entail. As yet, there is no collective recognition of the 
need for improved human interoperability communications procedures, as agencies presumably 
expect an out-of-the-box solution, based on patching radio systems together. 
When conducting this research, common themes were the need for a better definition of the 
issues associated with radio interoperability and the need for more enlightened approaches for 
emergency scene communications. Although examples of the need for better communication 
were easily found, the specific interoperability problem was generally ill-defined and the term 
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was misapplied to include non-technical challenges. While the solution to emergency scene 
communication generally equates to a technical treatment of how to patch one system to another, 
the larger question remains: What behavioral components (i.e. procedures, training) are required 
as a necessary adjunct to hardware interoperability communications solutions? Since the 
collective conscience of those within the homeland security discipline is still being developed, 
emergency scene communications issues represents something of a moving target.  
The experiences of Hurricane Katrina are starting to produce additional lessons learned. In 
both man-made and natural disasters, it can be anticipated that the infrastructure itself will be 
damaged, by whatever catastrophic event has occurred, plus communications will be limited by 
the amount of radio traffic squeezed onto whatever radio spectrum remains operational. One 
hospital in Gulfport, Mississippi thought they had adequately prepared for communications 
contingencies before Hurricane Katrina, with back-up equipment—including satellite telephones 
and short-wave radios—yet the dish on the roof and towers they relied upon were damaged by the 
hurricane-force winds (News-Sentinel, 2005). 
METHOD 
Transcripts from numerous critical incidents involving various combinations of fire, police, 
medical, local, and mutual aid units, responding to single and multi-jurisdictional incidents were 
analyzed.  This included coding incident transcripts from Sept 11, 2001, for timely and effective 
delivery of messages. (Due to space limitations, results from one large training exercise are the 
focus for this paper.) Scoring criteria included successful message delivery, economy of 
wording, number of times a message went unacknowledged, and number of times it was 
necessary for a message to be repeated. 
Case Study from a Regional Fire Training Exercise   
A study was conducted in the fall of 2005, where communications from a series of training 
exercises in the suburban cities north of Dallas, TX, were coded.  The specific purpose of the 
exercises was to practice working with other agencies, through a scripted series of actions to be 
taken at the scene of a simulated multiple-alarm structure fire. The exercises were held at a 
training academy where facilities allow for burning of straw and special effect lighting to create 
realistic building fire conditions. While the participants were focused on tactics and 
accomplishment of operational objectives, this case study enabled analysis of the communi-
cations conducted toward those goals. This is especially significant in validating the findings 
since the participants were not knowingly engaging in a study on communications, but rather 
using radios as they normally would at a building fire, with several separate agencies working 
together. 
 
The goal for this study was to measure the quality of first responder communications to 
determine where improvements in communications can be made. Participants were from a 
number of surrounding career departments, deployed in two-to-four person teams on engines, 
ladder trucks and medical units.  This exercise was typical of others in the multi-week series, 
insomuch as there were 13 units, totaling about 50 firefighters and command officers.  Each 
participant was provided with a portable radio on a common channel, with the incident 
commander and an aide seated in a command car (a sport utility vehicle), operating on a mobile 
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radio. Table 1 presents a description of the types of units participating in the training exercise, 
along with metrics relating to the communications conducted during the exercise.  
Table 1.   Communications Coding Analysis. 
 
Number of Fire Departments Participating 
 
5  
Number of Engine Companies 
 
6
Number of Truck Companies (or Engines w/Elevated Streams) 
 
5
Medical Units (Ambulances) 
 
2
Duration of the Exercise in Minutes 
 
62
Number of Communications Turns 
 
428
Average Length of Each Message in Seconds 
 
7
Number of Words Broadcast 
 
3556
Average Number of Words Per Communications Turn 
 
8




One of us [Timmons] obtained a recording of the radio transmissions occurring during the 
exercise, from which a written transcript was produced.  This provided the basis for scoring the 
communications conducted (included in Timmons, 2006).  Notations were made and tabulated 
for:  (1) instances in which the message was not received or was unclear and had to be repeated; 
(2) a subjective assessment rating of the excitement level of the voice (either normal or excited); 
(3) use of any codes or phases other than plain English; and (4) a subjective assessment rating on 
whether the message was critical to operational picture development and/or tactical efficiency, or 
whether another method could have been employed. 
RESULTS 
Analysis of communications produced a common pattern of coping mechanisms that require 
modification.  Table 2 presents results of the communications coding analysis. 
Table 2.  Communications Anomaly Summary. 
 
 




Percent of Turns 
 
 Unacknowledged Message 
 
51 11.9% 
 Needed to be Repeated 
 
21 4.9% 
 Confused/Unclear/Questionable Value 
 
11 2.6% 
 Exclamatory/Excited Message 
 
  5 1.2% 
 
The percentage of radio messages needing to be repeated was 4.9%; plus 11.9% of the radio 
messages were unacknowledged (33 out of the 51 unacknowledged messages were to the 
incident commander), and were presumed to be unheard.  In addition, 2.6% of the communi-
cations turns were judged to be a questionable use of radio airtime, e.g. face-to-face message 
exchange may have been more appropriate, the speaker was communicating redundant 
information, or information of questionable value was transmitted. The collective total of 
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repeated, unacknowledged, and questionable communications turns equaled 19.4% of all 
messages, indicating a significant opportunity to reclaim nearly one-fifth of all radio airtime lost 
to such inefficiencies. 
It should be noted that a few of the repeated messages occurred because personnel were 
trying to talk while wearing an airpack facepiece. Interference caused by the airpack facepiece 
has been an area of concern for many years, with only marginal success in technological 
improvement.2  This was not a major contributing factor, since the messages were discernable on 
the recordings reviewed. 
Documented Communications Problems   
Common communication impediments were noted in several transcripts of actual emergency 
recordings which were reviewed for this research. 
• Responding units tended to stop at the first injured person encountered at the periphery of 
the incident and call for an ambulance to that specific location, even when it was obvious 
that a mass casualty incident was underway, involving dozens, or even hundreds of victims.  
• Communications turns became clipped into ineffective bits, to the point where it was 
difficult to tell who was talking to whom. 
• If a field unit expressed excitement in their voice, the dispatcher’s voice tended to also rise 
in pitch and pace, but not to the full extent of the field users’. The dispatcher plays a key 
roll in keeping everyone calm by the use of a controlled voice inflection and in exuding a 
stoic confidence.   
• Units prefacing their transmissions with key words, such as “urgent” “priority message” or 
“emergency traffic,” got greater attention than those continuing to speak unacknowledged 
and without preface, even if they conveyed urgency in the pitch and pace of their speech. 
• Many incidents eventually got to the point where dispatchers and incident commanders 
tried to control and reduce the volume of radio traffic by limiting who was talking. 
Requests such as “all units stand-by” and “command officers only on this channel” were 
commonly heard.  
• A relatively small number of units dominated a majority of the airtime, often with non-
critical matters, while many units said nothing. The channel loading was unevenly skewed 
to a small portion of those present. 
Positive Practices 
Our analysis also revealed a pattern of best practices. 
• The most assiduous dispatchers and commanders tried to anticipate those things the field 
users might ask, and act to broadcast a summary of information, before it is asked for, in an 
effort to preempt use of the radio channel for repetitious information requests.  This 
includes best access routes, staging areas, triage points, command post locations, and brief 
                                                 
2 Greater attention is needed to the issue of responder communications while wearing respirator facepieces. Many 
agencies with limited experience in communicating while using respirator facepieces, especially in law enforcement, have 
issued respirators to their personnel, using homeland security grants. Extensive training and exercises should be provided 
for people new to operating with such equipment, prior to entry into hazardous environments. 
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situational updates. This relatively small menu of variables made up a disproportionate 
number of repetitious and superfluous radio transmissions. 
• The use of timed milestone updates gave the most even flow of information, 
acknowledging that time often gets out of phase—either faster or slower, to the perception 
of those involved at the scene. Many dispatch computer systems have automated features to 
trigger prompts to the dispatcher at timed intervals, i.e. every ten or 20 minutes. 
Dispatcher-initiated requests for updates from incident commanders, at timed-intervals, 
aids in development of an operational picture for those at the scene, as well as for support 
players off-site (still responding, or at alternate locations, such as Emergency Operations 
Centers). 
• Listening to recordings after an incident allows one to readily identify inappropriate 
assumptions, ineffective communications, and unacknowledged speech turns not evident to 
those involved at the moment. This can be attributed to the calm environment the reviewers 
are in and the lack of multi-sensorial stimuli imposed upon those performing as the incident 
was actually occurring. While it is not possible to eliminate all distractions and 
simultaneous demands placed upon those operating at emergency scenes, the inference here 
is great value would be derived if sensory input was managed and limited. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this section the reader is provided with communications improvement alternatives, which 
should be carefully weighed and tailored by first responder policy makers, while devising a 
policy best suited for their local jurisdiction. Operating practices and regional variations make it 
difficult and undesirable for the thousands of police and fire departments across the U.S. to 
operate in exactly the same way. Despite minor regional differences, the overriding need to 
cooperatively work together, in the spirit and intent of homeland security initiatives dictates the 
development of common practices and policies that will help first responders bridge these 
regional differences. One aspect of needed common practice and policies involves new 
procedures for use by first responders when using radio equipment designed to improve 
interoperability. 
Training 
One way to improve communications efficiency would be to provide training on better prioriti-
zation of radio messages and introduction of the concept of communication alternatives, other 
than public safety radio.  Face-to-face communication and sector-level task coordination are 
examples of ways to achieve objectives without use of radio resources. 
The presence of unacknowledged messages to the incident commander is an area of concern, 
and was noted in other un-scored exercises in this series, as well in the recordings studied from 
actual emergencies.  Further research is needed to fully assess predominant reasons for such 
inattention, since radio problems and clarity of the message were not noted on the recording. The 
incident commander was presumably attending to something else at that instant. 
It would be beneficial to have personnel at the emergency scene assigned exclusively to 
facilitate communications support for the incident commander.  Some large first responder 
departments have such scene-based communications capabilities (aides, chiefs’ drivers, etc).  
Other agencies should seek creative ways to develop such expertise, such as detailing first-
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arriving support personnel who often self-dispatch to large-scale incidents.  Greater operational 
efficiency, enhanced crew safety, and reclamation of scarce radio airtime can be expected if 
communications support personnel operate inside a quiet environment, at the command post, 
with the incident commander. Communications specialists should be supplied with adjunct 
devices, such as headphones and visual displays, allowing them to pay close attention to radio 
traffic and assist the incident commander in communications continuity. 
Changes to Radio Procedures  
Changes to radio procedures are needed to (i) manage and reduce the amount of radio 
transmissions; (ii) establish procedures and policies for treatment of large numbers of casualties 
without the need to call for help individually for each one; and (iii) command and control from a 
detached perspective to improve the quality of the information provided and control the vocal 
tone of those transmitting. 
The intent of this section is to suggest companion behavioral components that would enhance 
radio interoperability, acknowledging that more than a technological solution is required. The 
goal is to divert the dominant focus from technology and devise a template for agencies 
interested in optimizing their mission-critical communications. In doing so, the result will be 
better, more realistic expectations, and more effective communications within the limits of public 
safety radio infrastructure. These recommendations will likely gain widespread acceptance only 
after a series of practical failures continue, despite the expenditure of so much homeland security 
grant money to achieve interoperability.  
A set of new procedures were drafted for first responder agencies at the author’s [Timmons] 
city. The city of Plano, TX, is adjacent to the city of Dallas and is the home to 250,000 people.  
A separate department, Public Safety Communications, is responsible for the receipt of 911 calls 
and dispatching of the police, fire and medical units.  The department also operates the radio 
infrastructure for seven growing cities, covering over 250 square miles. 
As is the case with many public agencies, equipment purchased with homeland security 
grants has begun to arrive from a number of sources.  Little has been said about how to use it: 
The assumption has been that interoperability starts as soon as the boxes are opened. To 
overcome the inherent limitations of radio system patching of multiple units onto a common 
operational platform, a new procedure is proposed which prioritizes the use of limited radio 
resources by controlling the flow at the source.  These procedural recommendations are based on 
a review of numerous critical incidents involving various combinations of fire, police, medical, 
local, and mutual aid units, responding to single and multi-jurisdictional incidents, which 
revealed a common pattern of influences. 
New Procedure Proposed 
 
As a result of reviewing numerous recordings of critical incidents, it is apparent that the best 
practice would involve modification of radio system utilization, at the source, to optimize the 
quality of communications occurring to produce better – not more – communications turns.  To 
answer this need, a new procedure was devised by one of us [Timmons] whereby field units will 
modify their utilization of the system, once declaration of a critical incident is made.  This is not 
necessary for a routine building fire or bank robbery, but once a critical mass of units start 
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arriving at an intense incident, such as would be the case at a terrorist attack, it would be invoked 
to prioritize radio traffic. 
The policy draft presented to the Plano Fire Department, by Timmons, reads in part: 
It must be recognized that significant single or multiple events can create a 
communications system overload situation that negatively impacts scene operations. 
The expected, and understandable, emotional state of radio system users, combined 
with the shear number of units transmitting on a system, will frequently contribute to 
a disaster scene communications breakdown. There has been a tendency by some 
agencies to fragment operational groups at the same incident, onto different radio 
system talk-paths (talkgroups, channels, frequencies). While assigning additional 
talkgroups to sectorized functions provides some buffering, it must be remembered 
that it will become difficult for dispatchers and incident commanders to effectively 
monitor and control multiple talkgroups. Moreover, there is a practical limit to the 
number of simultaneous conversations possible on systems that typically are shared 
by several agencies, and routine radio traffic, will continue, in addition to the specific 
incident. 
Such a less is more posture, involving radio system use, runs counter to the 
policies practiced in daily response to routine incidents. All members must make a 
conscious effort at disaster scenes to resist the habits practiced in normal operations 
and limit their use of the radio system to the highest priority of life safety needs. 
Effective communication between dispatch and the incident commander must be 
the highest priority, based on the need to properly report size-up (initial appraisal of 
the scene), operational picture, and requests for additional resources.  To that end, 
dispatch will initiate a Priority Dispatch Policy whenever an intensive incident is 
underway and channel capacity issues are hampering effective communications.   
The policy draft presented to the Plano Fire Department, by Timmons, recommends: 
• Dispatch will announce, “The Priority Dispatch Policy is now in effect.” 
• A periodic, soft beeping tone will automatically be played on the channel as a 
reminder of the special condition. 
• Dispatch will answer with, “(Unit #) go ahead with priority traffic.” 
• Units operating on the channel will suspend routine traffic (calling en route, 
requesting assignments, repeating size-ups, etc). To support this step, dispatch 
will endeavor to broadcast (and periodically repeat) staging area locations, 
known hazards, triage area, and best access information. 
• Calling dispatch on the phone should be avoided since the incident itself is 
likely to stretch 911 Center capacity. The computer system should be used to 
achieve silent unit status change notification. 
Unit-to-unit traffic must be reduced, condensed and prioritized, in the interest of system 
capacity conservation. 
• Transmission of “Maydays” and “Emergency Traffic” receives highest priority. 
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• Whenever possible, transmission on the radio should be limited to command 
officers only. 
• Formation of self-contained task forces, based on alarm levels, moved-up from 
staging, offer the greatest opportunity for task assignment and accomplishment, 
with minimal radio transmissions. 
• Face-to-face communication with sector officers, after assignment from staging, 
provides the greatest prospect for member safety and operational objective 
achievement, without the use of radio narration typical at routine incidents. In 
this mode, the radio becomes a receiver of critical information, only broadcast 
upon for immediate, life safety issues. 
• During such times of peak system loading, it will be necessary to suspend or 
significantly abbreviate the fire department SOP Section 303.XII.A.7 (It states: 
When Incident Commanders issue assignments face-to-face, those assignments 
shall also be announced over the radio to insure that everyone at the incident is 
aware.) 
• Wherever practical, staging and sector officers will issue verbal, standing orders 
to be followed, until objective accomplishment, or until further notice. This will 
reduce the tendency of units to use airtime for task-related information, 
distracting to the overall operational picture. 
• At some point in all mass casualty incidents, it becomes impractical to make 
individual requests for ambulance responses, to specific victim locations. 
Whenever possible, low priority patients should be directed or assisted to a 
triage area, instead of requesting ambulances over the air to specific locations. 
• Within the limits of existing policy, patient reports to the hospital, broadcast on 
the radio system, should be appropriately abbreviated and standing orders 
implemented wherever practical. 
A similar policy is being proposed for local police department adoption, as well. 
The main implementation challenge will be to get people to reverse habits that have been 
developed and reinforced over years of day-to-day use of the system, and to apply new 
procedures for rare occurrences. This will be accomplished through training and practice at 
exercises.  
Full implementation across all disciplines and jurisdictions will need to go hand in hand with 
NIMS implementation. A centerpiece of the new procedure involves sectorizing the incident into 
manageable pieces, with command officers assigned to task and/or geographical locations. These 
commanders can assume a lot of line-of-sight and face-to-face communication with people in the 
task groups, thus eliminating much of the radio traffic at a critical incident. While the fire service 
has allowed sufficient time for incident command system principles to take hold, law 
enforcement and other agencies have considerable work ahead in transitioning from NIMS 
training to NIMS implementation. The Unified Command concept within NIMS is optimal when 
commanders from each agency are co-located at the same incident command post. While the 
separate command post concept is the practice in many locales, it probably has more to do with 
avoiding the who’s in charge issue than it does with any practical advantage. Unified Command 
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is much more difficult when communications paths must be relied upon instead of the optimal 
communications method, i.e., face-to-face. 
Homeland Security Grant Focus 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many officials reported communications issues between 
responders within the same department and with other agencies. These all struck a familiar chord 
since many of the same things were said after the Oklahoma City Bombing and Columbine 
school shooting, in addition to numerous incidents of regional significance around the country. 
Since that time, interoperability has arisen as a top grant funding priority. The rush to address the 
issue has made it all too easy for agencies to select equipment without much thought or due 
diligence.  
Immediately following 9/11, homeland security funds were first distributed in the manner we 
were most familiar with, i.e. pork barrel spending methodology. The distribution methods 
vacillated between one extreme where the most politically powerful were able to bring money to 
their home districts, and the other extreme where an equal distribution method resulted in an 
attempt to evenly distribute grant money to every state, which produced uneven per-capita 
expenditures in places where risk seemed remote. To answer the charges that a risk-based 
formula should be used, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funding system was devised 
in 2003 to skew the resource distribution toward the highest density of U.S. urban areas.  
In the short history of homeland security grant funding, we have experienced a unique 
pressure to make quantum improvements in our homeland security posture, literally “before the 
next attack.” The immediacy of the moment encouraged a process in which jurisdictions were 
under extreme time constraints to submit grant applications or risk the appearance and actuality 
of not getting money for the local effort, in competition with other cities nationwide. The 
tendency was to cursorily scan the menu of equipment available in standardized grant request 
forms, quickly make a choice (which generically would be identified as something like 
“interoperability equipment”), and get the verbiage and justification prepared in a short time 
span, before the arrival of immediate, inflexible deadlines. Then a few months would typically 
pass, and if approved the radio patching equipment would arrive, without much forethought on 
how it would be used, who would operate it, any potential security vulnerability it may create, 
and any deleterious effect it may have on communications networks. 
In essence, the cost of such equipment previously drove agencies to a deliberate process of 
alternative evaluations and careful selection based on operational needs. In the years since 9/11, 
it not only is easier to access the funds, but the process itself has encouraged haphazard requests 
for radio interconnection equipment and resulted in the development of unrealistic expectations. 
The expedited process has fostered a very real concern regarding the effect such equipment 
will have on the disaster operations of the future. While the equipment does hold the potential to 
improve emergency scene communications, improved communications will only result if the 
new equipment is deployed properly and if the users modify their radio habits. The likely 
outcome of having only a superficial appreciation of what the equipment operator is doing, and 
continuance of overly-chatty radio turns, will hasten the collapse of communications networks 
(due to overload), instead of producing the intended outcome of improving the quality and 
capacity of emergency communications. 
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Proactive agencies have an opportunity to be early adopters of new procedures and will avoid 
the inevitable failures of those relying exclusively upon a hardware solution.  To overcome the 
inherent limitations associated with patching multiple radio system units onto a common 
operational platform, a new procedure has been proposed to prioritize the use of limited radio 
resources, by controlling the flow of communications at the source.  
After reviewing numerous recordings of critical incidents, it is apparent that best practices 
would involve modifying radio system use, at the source, to optimize the quality of commun-
ications occurring to produce better not more communications turns.  To answer this need, a new 
procedure was devised whereby field units will modify their utilization of the system, once 
declaration of a critical incident is made.  Such a less is more posture, involving radio system 
use, runs counter to the policies practiced in daily response to routine incidents. All members 
must make a conscious effort at disaster scenes to resist the habits practiced in normal operations 
and limit their use of the radio system to the highest priority of life safety needs.    
 
Effective communication between dispatch and the incident commander must be the highest 
priority, based on the need to properly report size-up (initial appraisal of the scene), operational 
picture, and requests for additional resources. To that end, dispatch will initiate a Priority 
Dispatch Policy whenever an intensive incident is underway and channel capacity issues are 
hampering effective communications.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The 9/11 Commission Report goes into great detail about the failings of the radio systems of the 
various agencies responding to the terrorist attacks.  Transcripts and recordings reveal that there 
was almost constant chatter, albeit choppy and often unintelligible. Setting aside the technical 
issues, of which there were many, a lot of people still talked on the radio; so a lot was being said, 
but communication was weak. It is relatively easy to make any radio talk to another through 
patching equipment. Equipment being deployed now through homeland security grants will 
make patching equipment much more available than ever before.  But if each user of the system 
intends to use their radio in the same manner as they normally would on partitioned systems, it 
will be far more difficult to manage the large increase in the amount of radio traffic that will be 
squeezed onto a common platform. The result is likely to be even heavier radio congestion, and 
less, rather than more, effective communication.  
Due to the criticality of communications during crisis events, it is imperative to devote 
resources to developing and implementing new procedures for responders during emergencies. 
This serves to increase awareness of the need for people to communicate differently in overload 
situations, instead of the typical practices of loading more and more radio traffic into common 
radio space, until communications turns are not accomplished, and responder safety and 
effectiveness is impaired. 
By their very definition, high risk/low frequency events do not occur very often. It takes a 
tremendous amount of interest, discipline, and insightful appreciation for the need, to prepare for 
something that will only happen perhaps a handful of times in one’s career. This is a classic 
conundrum: How much time should we spend on something that may never happen?  Post-9/11 
management of first responders has pushed us into unknown territory, in this regard.  Deciding 
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on a prudent approach, appropriate for each locality, is one of the most pressing strategic issues 
of the next few years. 
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